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NAFIA and the Future of United States -
European Community Trade Relations:
The Consequences of Asymmetry in an
Emerging Era of Regionalism
By FREDERICK M. ABBOTrr*
When President George Bush announced the intention of the
United States to negotiate a free trade agreement with Mexico in
1990, the express agenda of the United States included encouraging
Mexico's movement toward a more open economy, enhancing Mexi-
can political and economic stability, and improving export and invest-
ment opportunities for American business enterprises. The United
States also had an unexpressed agenda, and this agenda included a
response to developments involving the European Community.
United States trade policy makers had concluded that the national in-
terest would not be well served by playing the role of passive observer
as the Community completed and implemented its 1992 Program, ex-
tended its preferential trading regime through the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) countries by negotiation of the European
Economic Area agreement, and deepened its preferential trading ar-
rangement with the Lom6 countries. The United States was prepared
to negotiate its own economic sphere of preference and influence in
the Western Hemisphere. Following the decision by Canada to join
the negotiations, the United States acted to pursue completion of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFrA)' with Canada and
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Technology. B.A. 1974, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School;
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efforts on this project. This article was presented in March 1993 at the Hastings Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review's Eleventh Annual Symposium on International
Legal Practice, "The European Community in Evolution: Toward a Closer Political & Eco-
nomic Union."
1. On December 17, 1992, the Presidents of the United States of America and the
United Mexican States and the Prime Minister of Canada signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed in Three Capitals,
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Mexico, extending the existing Canada-United States Free 'rade
Agreement.2 The decision of the United States to negotiate NAFTA
signaled the emergence of a new era of regionalism in international
trading relations.
This article will set out the legal context of the emerging trading
relationship between the European Community and NAFTA. The
present situation of the Community with respect to non-member
country goods, services, and investment will be described and ana-
lyzed. NAFTA's proposed treatment of non-party goods, services,
and investment will likewise be described and analyzed. This article
will explore the consequences of present and potential asymmetries
between the external effects of these regional arrangements and offer
some suggestions as to how the United States and European Commu-
nity may attempt to ameliorate potential conflict. The resolution of
uncertainties concerning the interpretation of the EEC Treaty3 - un-
certainties that involve the power of Community organs to restrict the
right of establishment and the freedom to provide the services of
third-country-owned enterprises within the Community - is critical
to determining the prospective access of U.S. enterprises to that mar-
ket and thus to determining the balance of concessions between the
United States and the Community. The proposed Maastricht Treaty
on European Union,4 which includes amendments to the EEC Treaty,
is particularly troublesome as these amendments seem to create (or
confirm) in the Community organs a power to condition access to the
internal market that may be presently lacking in the European Com-
munity (EC) charter. In addition, the bilateral treaties of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) between members of the Commu-
nity and the United States, and the multilateral Organization for Eco-
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at C1. Prior to its entry into force (scheduled for January 1,
1994), the agreement must be approved by the legislative bodies of the respective countries
and notification of the completion of such procedures must be exchanged. The text of
NAFTA referred to in this article is conformed to Canada-Mexico-United States: North
American Free Trade Agreement, 31 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993). See generally Frederick M.
Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the
Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917 (1992); Potential Impact on the U.S.
Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free-rade Agreement, US1TC
Pub. 2596 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter ITC Report].
2. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-
Canada, 27 I.L.M. 281.
3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY].
4. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.LM. 247 [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
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nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 5  Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements,6 will affect the right of estab-
lishment of enterprises of each region. Questions about the status and
effect of these FCN Treaties and the OECD Code must be resolved
for an effective evaluation of U.S.-Community trade relations.
The November 1992 report on NAFTA of the External Economic
Relations Committee of the European Parliament,7 which includes
the Opinion of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee8 and the
subsequent resolution of the Parliament regarding NAFTA, are im-
portant as initial formal reactions of the Community to NAFTA.
These documents reflect a remarkably divided view of NAFrA: the
External Economic Relations Committee, on the one hand, takes a
moderate approach to NAFTA and welcomes the agreement to the
extent that it creates trade and is compatible with the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 9; the Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee, on the other hand, raises an alarm about serious political
and economic threats to the Community, perhaps justifying sharp re-
sponsive measures. This article urges political leaders and trade nego-
tiators to avoid the rhetoric of war and to concentrate instead on
negotiating an acceptable balance of trade concessions.
I. THE SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY WITH
RESPECT TO NON-MEMBER COUNTRY GOODS,
SERVICES, AND INVESTMENT
A. Trade in Goods
The European Community is a customs union established under
GATT Article XXIV.1° As such, the Community has substantially
5. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, art. 2, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
6. OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (1990 ed.) [hereinafter
OECD Code].
7. Report of the European Parliament Committee on External Economic Relations
on the Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America, Canada, and Mex-
ico, A3-0378/92, Nov. 18, 1992, DOC ENXRR\217\217513, PE 201.9301fin [hereinafter EC
Parliament Report] (Rapporteur: Mr. Gijs de Vries).
8. Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security for the Committee on
External Economic Relations, appended to EC Parliament Report, supra note 7, at 19-22
[hereinafter Foreign Affairs Opinion] (Draftsman: Mr. Tltiley).
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GA"T].
10. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, GATT and tie European Community: A
Formula for Peaceful Coexistence, 12 MicH. J. Ihr'L L. 1, 13-15 (1990); THE EuROPEAN
CoMMuNtrY AND GATT (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
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eliminated tariffs and related charges on the movement of goods be-
tween its member countries and has established a common outer tariff
wall." The charter of the Community, the EEC 'Treaty, moreover,
expressly provides that goods that have entered the Community from
third countries will be considered in free circulation within the Com-
munity after having paid the applicable common duty when entering
the first member country.12 Thus, goods exported from the United
States enjoy acquired free circulation in the Community once a single
tariff is paid upon entry. The grant of acquired free circulation to
goods of third countries is not mandated by article XXIV of the
GATr, and, as will be seen, is not a feature of the proposed
NAFTA.' 3 It is a particular advantage that the Community accords to
third-country exporters.
This does not mean that all is rosy with respect to the Commu-
nity's treatment of third-country exports. The most visible barrier to
third-country trade in goods is the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) pursuant to which the Community has established "common
machinery for stabilizing imports or exports. ' 14 One feature of the
CAP is the variable levy, which has the effect of imposing on third-
country agricultural exports a level of duty intended to offset higher-
11. The Community has exceeded GATT Article XXIV requirments by reducing or
eliminating restrictions in a variety of areas outside trade in goods. See Abbott, supra note
10, at 13.
12. The EEC Treaty provides:
Article 9.1. The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall
cover all trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member
States of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having
equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations
with third countries.
Article 9.2. [This provision, inter alia,] shall apply to products originating in
Member States and to products coming from third countries which are in free
circulation in Member States.
Article 10.1. Products coming from a third country shall be considered to be in
free circulation in a Member State if the import formalities have been complied
with and any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are paya-
ble have been levied in that Member State....
EEC TREATY, supra note 3, arts. 9(1)-(2), 10(1).
13. The author has not examined the legislative history of the EEC Treaty for support-
ing evidence on this point, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the United States,
which at the time of the Community founding played a direct and substantial role in its
formation, extracted acquired free circulation for its exports in exchange for its support of
the overall enterprise.
14. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 40(3). Article 40(3) provides, inter alia, that "[t]he
common organization shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out ... and shall
exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community,"
There is no bar against discrimination vis-A-vis third-country suppliers. Id.
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than-world-market Community agricultural prices resulting from a
comprehensive price support/subsidy system. Elimination of the trade
distortions created by the CAP is one of the principal goals of the
GAT Uruguay Round. The Community also discriminates against
third-country exports by the employment of "gray-area" mechanisms,
such as voluntary export restraint agreements. The Community has
been the subject of complaints by the United States and others in the
GAT with respect to various discriminatory and allegedly discrimi-
natory practices relating to third-country goods.15 As permitted under
the GAIT system, the Community maintains discriminatory prefer-
ences for Community-produced goods with respect to government
procurement. 6
B. Services and Investment Provisions of the EEC reaty
The situation of the Community with respect to services and in-
vestment is substantially more complex than the situation with respect
to trade in goods. The GATT does not cover trade in services and
investment. Thus, at present there are no overarching GATT-based
trade law principles pertaining to services and investment that are ap-
plicable either to the individual member states or to the Community
as a whole. However, these areas are affected by other bilateral and
multilateral agreements. Coverage is now under negotiation in the
GATT Uruguay Round.
Article 52 of the establishment chapter of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides for the gradual elimination of restrictions on the freedom of es-
tablishment of nationals of a member state in the territory of another
member state.' 7 "Freedom of establishment" is defined to include the
right to "set up and manage undertakings" on the condition of na-
tional treatment.'8 Article 58 of the treaty provides that: "Companies
or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or principle place
of business within the Community shall, for purposes of this Chapter,
15. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member-Legal
Conflicts Between GATT Law and European Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN COM-
murn-Y A GATT, supra note 10, at 49-50; ROBERT HUDEc, Thu GAT IEGAL SYsTEt
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990).
16. EC preferences with respect to government purchases of telecommunications and
utility equipment are the subject of a pending political dispute with the United States. See
USTR Kantor Sets Plan to Sanction EC Over "Intolerable" Procurement Law, BNA INTL
TRADE DALy, Feb. 2,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ITRADE/BNA1TD File.
17. EEC TREAry, supra note 3, art. 52.
18. Id.
1993]
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be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of the
Member States."' 9 The EEC Treaty provides in article 59 of the serv-
ices chapter for the progressive elimination of barriers to the free pro-
vision of services within the Community "in respect of nationals of
Member States who are established in a State of the Community other
than that of the person for whom the services are intended. '20 Article
66 provides that article 58 of the establishment chapter, inter alia, shall
apply to the matters covered by the services chapter. Thus, the rule
that companies or firms formed in accordance with the laws of a mem-
ber state be treated as natural persons who are nationals of a member
state also applies to the services chapter.
Article 58 of the EEC Treaty is not qualified with respect to the
national origin of the owner of a company or firm established within
the Community. Early in Community history, the Council of Minis-
ters provided that the right of establishment in a member state and
the freedom to provide services are not to be dependent on the na-
tionality of the owner of a company or firm.2 It thus has been gener-
ally concluded that formation by a third-country owner of a business
entity somewhere within the Community would qualify the estab-
lished Community entity for treatment as a national of a member
state,' provided that, in accordance with Council dictate, such local
enterprise "show a continuous and effective link with the economy of
a Member State."'  It also generally has been concluded that a third-
country-owned enterprise, having been formed in a member state,
19. Id. art. 58. Article 58 continues: "'Companies or firms' means companies or firms
constituted under civil or commercial law, including co-operative societies, and other legal
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making. Id,
20. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 59.
21. General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establishment
and General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom to Provide Services,
1962 J.O. 32, reprinted in COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 1335ff, 1545ff (1962) [hereinafter
General Program].
22. See ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 23-26 (1971)
for an analysis and a description of unsuccessful efforts by the French government during
negotiation of the EEC Treaty to incorporate a provision authorizing the Commission to
exclude from the benefits of the freedom of establishment chapter companies established
within a member state but controlled by third-country nationals, as well as later French
legislative efforts to discriminate against third-country-owned enterprises with respect to
direct investment-related transactions. See also Abbott, GATT and the European Commu-
nity, supra note 10, at 48, n.149 and authorities cited therein, including an interview with a
Community official.
23. See General Program, supra note 21, tit. I. See generally ERIC STEIN ET AL., EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 631-32 (1976); 2 HANS SMIT &
PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, §§ 58.05-.06
(1992).
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would be entitled to exercise the right of freedom of service provision
on a Community-wide basis, that is, to provide services in member
states other than the country of establishment.F4
It must be noted that because of the particular drafting of the
EEC Treaty, the establishment by a third-country owner of a branch
office in a member state does not necessarily qualify that branch for
treatment as a member-state national. If branch offices are to be ac-
corded national treatment in respect to freedom of services, that is to
be at the direction of the Council pursuant to article 59(2) of the EEC
Treaty.
1. Treaty Obligations of Community Member States
As discussed, supra, article 58 of the EEC Treaty provides that
companies or firms formed under the law of a member state will be
assimilated as natural persons who are nationals of member states for
purposes of the establishment and (by operation of article 66) the
services chapters. Article 58 and the establishment chapter in general,
however, do not purport to regulate the member states of the Com-
munity concerning the establishment of third-country-owned enter-
prises within their respective territories. As a result, unless otherwise
pre-empted by the EEC Treaty or secondary Community law, the laws
24. See STEIN ET AL-, supra note 23, at 631-32; SMrr & HEuzoG, supra note 23, § 58.06.
25. Branches are not companies or firms organized in a member state so as to qualify
them for treatment as natural persons who are nationals of member states under article 58.
It has, for example, been said with respect to the banking sector
No distinction can therefore be made under [European Economic Community]
EEC law in case of companies set up within the Community which are majority or
fully owned by non-EEC subjects in respect of the above mentioned rights [re-
garding establishment and services].
These companies have therefore the right to establish themselves in other EEC
countries under the harmonized provisions of local law and to provide services
throughout the Community.
Things stand differently in respect of branches of non-EEC companies set up in a
Member State, such as branches of U.S. banks. Conditions of establishment of
banks and insurance companies have been regulated by the various directives
concerning establishment of banks and insurance companies at conditions
equivalent to those of other EEC countries companies.
EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 58. See a4o Giorgio Sacerdoti, Freedom of Services in the
EEC, in 1992: DOING BusINEss wrr EUROPE, A.B.A. 317, 325-26 (1989).
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty, as amended by the SEA, provides that the Council,
acting by qualified majority on proposal from the Commission, may "extend the provisions
of this Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and who are estab-
lished within the Community." EEC TrEATY, supra note 3, art. 59. Under this authority,
the Council may extend freedom of service rights to third-country-owned branches. Id.
1993]
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of the individual member states govern the right of foreign entities to
establish within their respective territories.26
There are in force bilateral FCN Treaties between the United
States and every member country of the European Community, ex-
cept Portugal.2 7 There is a considerable range to the operative lan-
guage of these FCN Treaties as they address the right of nationals of
each other to establish and operate enterprises within their respective
territories. As an example of favorable reciprocal treatment, the FCN
Treaty of 1948 between the United States and Italy provides:
The nationals, corporations and associations of either High Con-
tracting Party shall be permitted, in conformity with the applicable
laws and regulations within the territories of the other High Con-
tracting Party, to organize, control and manage corporations and
associations of such other High Contracting Party for engaging in
commercial, manufacturing, processing, mining, educational, philan-
thropic, religious and scientific activities ... upon terms no less
favorable than those now or hereafter accorded to corporations and
associations of such other High Contracting Party controlled by its
own nationals, corporations and associations.
28
26. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76, with respect to tho Second Banking Di-
rective and secondary Community legislation which may pre-empt member state law, i.e.,
by providing that the Commission and Council are authorized to suspend the right of a
member state to permit the establishment of a new banking institution or the acquisition of
holdings in an existing banking institution.
27. See Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, U.S.-Belg.,
14 U.S.T. 1284; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, U.S.-Den.,
12 U.S.T. 908; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, U.S.-Fr., 11 U.S.T. 2398;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., 7 U.S.T. 1839;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, U.S.-Italy, 63 Stat. 2255;
Agreement Supplementing the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Sept. 26,
1951, U.S.-Italy, 12 U.S.T. 131; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21,
1950, U.S.-Ir., 1 U.S.T. 785; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23,
1962, U.S.-Lux., 14 U.S.T. 251; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar, 27,
1956, U.S.-Neth., 8 U.S.T. 2043; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3,
1951, U.S.-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829; Treaty of Friendship and General Relations, July 3,1902,
U.S.-Spain, 33 Stat. 2105; Convention of Commerce and Navigation, July 3, 1815, U.S.-
U.K., 8 Stat. 228.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1992, at 17 (Belg.),
at 59 (Den.), at 79 (Fr.), at 87 (F.R.G.), at 94 (Greece), at 120 (Ir.), at 125 (Italy), at 151
(Lux.), at 172 (Neth.), at 223 (Spain), at 254 (U.K.). See generally Joseph J. Norton, Status
of U.S. Commercial Treaties With the E.E.C. Member States, in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
CoMUNITrrY: TRADrE AND INvEsTMENT 10-11 (J. Norton ed. 1986); Mark A. Goldstein,
1992 and the FCN and OECD Obligations of EEC Member States to the United States in the
Financial Services Area, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 189 (1990).
28. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, supra note 27, art.
111(2).
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With respect to the activities that these locally-established, foreign-
owned enterprises are entitled to conduct, they are entitled to do so
on both a national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) basisp
An example of a somewhat more restricted treatment is found in
the FCN Treaty of 1954 between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany.30 While this treaty accords national and MFN
treatment to the establishment and control of enterprises in the re-
spective territories of the parties,3' the parties reserve the right to
limit the activities of each other's nationals in a number of sectors
involving enterprises established after the adoption of limiting
measures.
3 2
Regarding the right of nationals to establish and conduct com-
mercial banking operations, a majority of the FCN Treaties between
the United States and EC member states expressly permit some form
of derogation from the national treatment standard. 3 Similar limita-
tions are present in the communications sector, either in the form of a
right to derogate from the national treatment standard or in the form
of acknowledgement of a more general right to maintain government-
owned or chartered monopolies.3
A number of the FCN Treaties entered into before the EEC
Treaty became effective contain a safeguard clause which permits the
denial of national treatment and MFN rights on the basis of a party
having entered into a customs union, but with the exception of the
safeguards clauses in the FCN Treaties with Italy and the Netherlands,
these clauses relate to matters involving imports and exports of
29. Id. art. I(2)-(3).
30. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-F.RG., supra note 27.
31. Id. art. VII(1)-(4).
32. Id. art. VHI(2) (referring to enterprises engaged in communications, air or water
transport, taking and administering trusts, banking involving depository functions, or the
exploitation of land or other natural resources).
33. FCN Treaties in which derogation from national treatment with respect to the
commercial banking sector is permitted are those between the United States and Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
34. FCN Treaties in which derogation from national treatment with respect to the
communications sector is permitted are those between the United States and Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In a number of FCN Treaties in
which the right to derogate from the national treatment standard in regard to the commu-
nications sector is not expressly included, the right to maintain government-owned or
chartered monopolies is acknowledged (e.g., FCN Treaties between the United States and
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and Italy). In any event, the right of a government party to an
FCN Treaty to own or charter a monopoly in a public service sector may constitute an
implicit exception to the national treatment standard.
1993]
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goods.35 An Exchange of Notes between the United States and the
Netherlands, which took place prior to entry into force of the EEC
Treaty, specifically acknowledged that the Netherlands might be pre-
cluded from extending EC-based advantages to U.S. enterprises in ac-
cordance with its FCN Treaty in areas beyond the scope of imports
and exports, thereby potentially excluding favorable customs union
treatment with respect to the right of establishment and the provision
of services.36 The FCN Treaty with Italy carves out a broad exception
from extending customs union advantages between the parties.3 7 It
has been argued that the intent of the parties in negotiating this clause
was to encompass only advantages relating to trade in goods because
customs unions were not understood to involve matters beyond trade
in goods at the time the FCN Treaty was made. This argument, while
seemingly persuasive because of the time period in question, may nev-
ertheless need some additional contextual support in the face of clear
and broad language in the treaty pursuant to which the parties are not
obligated to extend customs union advantages.3 8 A factor which dis-
tinguishes the FCN Treaties between the United States, on the one
hand, and Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, on the other hand, is
that these FCN Treaties entered into force after the EEC 'reaty en-
tered in force in 1958.39
The relationship between the FCN Treaties and the EEC Treaty
is a matter of some interest. Article 234 of the EEC Treaty provides:
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded
before the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on
the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this treaty.
35. See Goldstein, supra note 27, at 214.
36. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Neth., supra note 27.
37. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, supra note 27, art.
XXlV(3)(b).
38. Goldstein argues that since GATT article XXIV creates an exception only for
trade in goods, and not for matters such as establishment rights, the United States and Italy
must have intended their safeguards clause only to exempt them from goods-related MFN
obligations. The parties, in his view, would not have had the right of establishment in mind.
See Goldstein, supra note 27, at 214-16. This argument is bolstered somewhat by an Ex-
change of Notes dated July 26, 1949, between the American Ambassador to Italy and the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which refers to article XXIV(3)(c) in the context of
provisions of the FCN Treaty relating to the treatment of goods. See Agreement Supple-
menting the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, supra note 27, 12
U.S.T. at 287-88.
39. The EEC Treaty entered into force on January 1,1958. The Treaties with Belgium,
France, and Luxembourg entered into force on October 3, 1963, December 21, 1960, and
March 28, 1963, respectively.
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To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this
Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appro-
priate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member
States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall,
where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.
In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph,
Member States shall take into account the fact that the advantages
accorded under this Treaty by each Member State form an integral
part of the establishment of the Community and are thereby in-
separably linked with the creation of common institutions, the con-
ferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same
advantages by all the other Member States.4°
The language of the first paragraph of article 234 is unambiguous. If a
pre-existing treaty between a member state and a third country con-
fers fights or establishes obligations with respect to a third country,
e.g., the United States, those rights and obligations take precedence
over inconsistent obligations established by the EEC Treaty. This in-
terpretation of the first paragraph of article 234 has been confirmed,
though not in the specific context of a bilateral FCN Treaty involving
the United States, by the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) in Attor-
ney General v. Burgoa.41 Moreover, in Burgoa, the Court of Justice
said:
Although the first paragraph of article 234 makes mention only of
the obligations of the Member States, it would not achieve its pur-
pose if it did not imply a duty on the part of the institutions of the
Community not to impede the performance of the obligations of
Member States which stem from a prior agreement.
42
Thus, under ordinary principles of treaty law,43 express provisions of
40. EEC TRE-ATY, supra note 3, art. 234.
41. See Case 812f79, Attorney General v. Burgoa, 1980 E.C.R. 2787,2 C.M.L.R. 193
(1980), in which the Court said:
[T]he purpose of [the first paragraph of article 234 of the EEC Treaty] is to lay
down, in accordance with international law, that the application of the Treaty
does not affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of
non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations
thereunder.
Burgoa, 1980 E.C.R. at 2803. See also Case 286186, Ministere Public v. Deserbais, 1988
E.C.R. 4907, 1 C.M.L.1R 516 (1988).
42. Burgoa, 1980 E.C.R. at 2803.
43. Pursuant to article 30(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
later-in-time treaty does not affect the obligations of parties to a prior treaty who are not
also parties to the later treaty as among themselves. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30(4)(b), 8 LL.M. 679, 691 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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the EEC Treaty,44 and by reference to the case law of the Court of
Justice, an existing bilateral FCN Treaty should also prevail over sec-
ondary Community legislation, both as to third-country parties and
within the Community.45 Therefore, a U.S. company that enjoys the
right of establishment or freedom to provide services in a member
state of the Community on the basis of an FCN Treaty entered into
prior to the EEC Treaty should continue to enjoy that privilege. The
Community arguably has the right under article 113,46 which concerns
the common commercial policy, and the second paragraph of article
23417 to cause a member state to modify or terminate a bilateral FCN
Treaty, if that treaty is deemed to be incompatible with the member
state's obligations under the EEC Treaty. The Community has not as
yet attempted to exercise this power.48 Moreover, by annual decision
commencing in 1970, the Council has authorized the continuation in
force of FCN Treaties between the United States and the member
states, stating in the recitals, inter alia, that such approval "does not
absolve the Member States from the obligation of avoiding and, where
appropriate, eliminating any incompatibility between such treaties
and agreements and the provisions of Community law."
'49
The status and effect of the right of establishment and freedom of
services provisions in FCN Treaties entered into subsequent to the
EEC Treaty differ from the status and effect of those provisions in
pre-existing FCN Treaties. The member states that entered into FCN
Treaties with the United States subsequent to the EEC Treaty did not
44. For example, article 173 of the EEC Treaty confers on the ECJ the power to re-
view the legality of acts of the Council and Commission on grounds, inter alia, of "infringe-
ment of this Treaty." EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 173. Under article 174, the E.C.J.
may declare an act of the Council or Commission void. Id. art. 174,
45. While the parties to the EEC Treaty might have conferred on decision-making
institutions the power to cause their member states to breach their treaty obligations with
respect to non-parties, the ECJ, per the Burgoa decision, supra note 41, has already indi-
cated that the member states did not intend to confer that power on the Community
organs.
46. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 27, § 10.02.
47. Cf. SMrr & HERZOG, supra note 23, § 234.03.
48. Norton, supra note 27, § 10.03[3].
49. See, e.g., Council Decision of 28 April 1992, which authorizes the automatic re-
newal or maintenance in force of provisions governing matters of common commercial
policy contained in the Friendship, 'Tade and Navigation treaties and similar agreements
concluded between Member States and third countries. Council Decision of 28 April 1992
(92/234/EEC), 1992 O.. (L 120) 1. This authorization does not specifically reference all of
the FCN Treaties between EC member states and the United States referred to herein.
This may be because the member states did not request certain authorizations, but the
author has not yet been able to confirm this. See also Norton, supra note 27, § 10.02, 10-12.
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modify their obligations with respect to other member states. ° They
did, however, establish new obligations with respect to the United
States and, to the extent of inconsistencies, may at least potentially
have breached obligations to other member states under the EEC
Treaty. 1 It must be presumed that the under the general scheme es-
tablished by the EEC Treaty, the individual member states are not
entitled to supersede the treaty's provisions by a subsequent inconsis-
tent treaty, just as they may not supersede the treaty's provisions by a
subsequent inconsistent statute,52 so that among the member states
the EEC Treaty would prevail over inconsistent provisions in the
later-in-time FCN Treaties.53 However, notwithstanding their rights
and obligations to other member states under the EEC Treaty,
Belgium, France, and Luxembourg owe obligations to the United
States under the later-in-time FCN Treaties and would be in breach of
their obligations if they failed to abide by the terms of such treaties.
With regard to the rights of third countries under pre-existing
treaties containing MFN clauses, Smit and Herzog have suggested that
pursuant to "indirect language" and "moderate but conclusive lan-
guage" in article 234 of the EEC Treaty, third countries may not take
advantage of the privileges accorded by the member states as among
themselves on the basis of the most-favored-nation or the non-dis-
crimination principle in the EEC Treaty.54 According to these writers,
this rule, which is found in article 234, is "based on the well estab-
lished tradition that advantages which parties to a customs union
grant each other are not available to other countries on the basis of a
most-favored-nation clause. 5 If these writers refer to GATIT and the
obligation pursuant to GATT Article I to extend tariff privileges on
an MFN basis, their observation is undoubtedly correct. GATT estab-
50. See Vienna Convention, supra note 42, art. 30(4)(b), 8 I.L.M. at 691.
51. See id. arts. 30, 60.
52. See eg., Case 10677, Administrazione delle Fmanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal,
1978 E.CJ. 629.
53. Norton suggests that the three later-in-time treaties "would ... be generally up-
held in view of the Court of Justice's interpretation of the treaty-making powers of the
Community," expressing the following view:
Although the French, Luxembourg and Belgian treaties were signed subsequent
to the creation of the E.E.C., it does not appear that at the time these treaties
were negotiated the E.E.C. can be seen as possessing exclusive competence to
negotiate the provisions of these treaties. To the knowledge of this writer, no
commentators nor the E.E.C. institutions have ever asserted such a view.
Norton, supra note 27, § 10.04[3] r.4.
54. Swrr & HERZOG, supra note 23, § 234.03.
55. Id., referred to by Goldstein, supra note 27, at 220 n.190, who also disagrees with
the conclusion of Smit and Herzog.
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lishes a specific waiver of the MFN principle for customs unions, and
GATT contracting parties were notified of the Community's claim of
this waiver.16 However, to the extent they imply that individual mem-
ber state privileges relating to establishment (and by extension to
services) accorded by bilateral FCN Treaties would not permit access
to privileges accorded by the Community system,57 this suggestion is
unpersuasive. The bilateral FCN Treaties in force between the United
States and Community member states were known to the drafters of
the EEC Treaty and deal with matters directly affected by that treaty.
The member states could have been required by the EEC Treaty to
alter the status and effect of the FCN Treaties which, instead, affirms
them in force and effect. Moreover, paragraph 2 of article 234 calls on
member states to take action to remedy inconsistencies between the
EEC Treaty and pre-existing treaties. Such action has not been taken,
and the Community has expressly authorized the continuation in force
of such FCN Treaties. 8 Only the Netherlands (and arguably Italy)
had created a broad customs union exception that should cover its
FCN obligations relating to establishment. The other member states
could, but have not, reformed or.withdrawn their FCN obligations re-
garding the right of establishment. 59 On the basis of these facts, there
is no basis to conclude that a customary rule of trade law relating to
the extension of customs union privileges, if it exists, should prevail
over bilateral FCN Treaties that concern matters of establishment and
are directly affirmed by article 234, paragraph 1 of the EEC Treaty. A
U.S.-owned enterprise should be entitled to establishment privileges
in most EC member states pursuant to pre-existing FCN Treaties and,
by operation of article 58 of the EEC Treaty, should be afforded es-
tablishment and services rights within the Community equivalent to
those of member-state-owned enterprises.
The right of U.S. companies to provide services freely within the
Community pursuant to the FCN Treaties arises from the right ac-
56. See Abbott, GATT and the European Community, supra note 10, at 24, and au-
thorities cited therein.
57. It should be noted that Smit and Herzog do not address the effect of national
treatment clauses in pre-existing treaties, and they might therefore agree that third coun-
tries are entitled to Community privileges under national treatment clauses. See SMIT &
HERZOG, supra note 23.
58. See Norton, supra note 27, § 10.02, citing Council Decision of January 24, 1983
(authorizing the automatic renewal or continuation in force of certain friendship, trade,
and navigation treaties and similar agreements concluded between member states and non-
member countries).
59. See generally id.
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corded to U.S. nationals to form companies or firms on a national
treatment basis, and not through the freedom of services provisions in
these treaties which are territori'ally limited. In other words, while
certain of the FCN Treaties specifically grant to U.S. nationals the
right to provide services on a national treatment basis, this right is
extended only to the individual member state territory and not
throughout the Community.6° Thus, the mechanism by which the
FCN Treaty provides to U.S.-owned enterprises freedom to provide
services within the Community is: formation of a local enterprise
under the FCN Treaty, operation of article 58 of the EEC Treaty to
assimilate that entity to a natural person who is a national of a mem-
ber state, and operation of article 66 to extend to that national the
right of freedom to provide services.
There exists some ambiguity with respect to the potential benefits
conferred on U.S. enterprises by the OECD Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements.61 Like the FCN Treaties, the OECD Code estab-
lishes binding obligations with respect to OECD members, which in-
clude the United States and all EC member states.62 The OECD
Code provides, subject to various reservations, that the country par-
ties will permit establishment of foreign-owned enterprises within
their territory. Extension of the right of establishment does not
strictly involve the grant of national treatment.63 There is an obliga-
60. Provisions in FCN Treaties between the United States and Community member
states, with various exceptions, establish the right to provide services within each country
on both an MFN and national treatment basis. For example, the Treaty between the
United States and Germany provides that "[n]ationals and companies of either party shall
be accorded, within the territories of the other Party, national treatment with respect to
engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activity for gain."
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-F.R.G., supra note 27, art. VII(I).
This right is subject to limitation in certain areas with respect to newly established enter-
prises. Id. art. VII(2). Although this right is of interest with respect to Germany and the
provision of services within the German market, it does not follow that the right to na-
tional treatment should permit a U.S.-owned enterprise to participate in the Community
market as a whole on a national treatment basis. The FCN Treaty by its express terms
limits national treatment "within the territory of the other Party." Id. By operation of its
MFN obligation, Germany may be obligated to treat a U.S.-owned enterprise within its
territory on the same basis that it treats enterprises owned by nationals of EC member
states.
61. OECD Code, supra note 6.
62. Id.
63. See id., arts. 1-2, annex A, list A, part 1. A "Remark" following the provision
relating to the right of establishment prohibits "measures that raise special barriers or limi-
tations with respect to non-resident (as compared to resident) investors, and that have the
intent or effect of preventing or significantly impeding direct investment by non-residents."
The condition that to be prohibited differential measures must prevent or "significantly
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tion not to discriminate with respect to parties to the Code64 (an MFN
obligation), but this is subject to an exception for customs unions.
65
The customs union exception is ambiguous. It permits members of a
customs union to adopt liberalizing measures among themselves in ad-
dition to their express commitments under the Code's applicable
schedule. Since the general establishment provision does not strictly
require national treatment, it is apparently possible for customs union
members to meet their commitment to accord establishment rights to
other OECD members, while preferentially discriminating among
themselves through the grant of more favorable Community-based es-
tablishment terms. Finally, the OECD Code extends rights to OECD
investors only to provide services with respect to limited sectors and
subject to reservations.66 For this reason, the Code may be a useful
adjunct to FCN Treaties and the EEC Treaty. It will not, however,
provide significant benefits until ambiguities regarding, for example,
the effect of the customs union provision are eliminated.67 Finally,
since the European Community is itself not a party to the OECD
Code,68 and since the member states of the Community are not em-
powered to supersede by subsequent treaty the terms of the EEC
Treaty, resolution of the uncertainties of the EEC Treaty is paramount
to determining the effect of the OECD Code with respect to U.S.-
owned investments in the Community.
2. Community Practice and the Maastricht Treaty
Although the Community has not yet acted to restrict the right of
U.S.-owned enterprises to form companies or firms within the mem-
ber states or to subsequently provide services on a Community-wide
basis, it has adopted and proposed secondary Community legislation
by which it appears to reserve the right to do so. It is not at all appar-
ent that at present the Community has the power under the EEC
Treaty to take action to restrict the right of third-country-owned en-
impede" inward investment would seem to offer less protection to third-country investors
than a genuine national treatment requirement. Id.
64. Id. art. 9.
65. Id. art. 10. Article 10 provides: "Members forming part of a special customs or
monetary system may apply to one another, in addition to measures of liberalization taken
in accordance with the provisions of article 2(a), other measures of liberalization without
extending them to other members." Id. art. 10.
66. See id. art. 2, annex A, annex B.
67. This problem is alluded to in SMrr & HF-Rzoo, supra note 23, § 234.05.
68. See SMrr & HERzoo, supra note 23, §§ 231.03, 234.05.
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terprises to form companies or firms within the member states,69 most
particularly in the face of member state/third-country FCN Treaties
predating the EEC Treaty. The member states have authorized the
EC Commission to negotiate a General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices in the GATT Uruguay Round, and this agreement will likely ad-
dress conditions on third-country establishment rights. The member
states have not yet agreed that such a GAIT agreement could be con-
cluded without their direct participation.70 The Maastricht Treaty un-
dertakes to remedy this situation, at least outside the context of the
FCN Treaties. 71
69. Article 55, paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty establishment chapter provides that:
"The Council may, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, rule
that the provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to certain activities." EEC TREA-y,
supra note 3, art. 55, para. 2. Smit and Herzog suggest that this exemption should only be
available to the Council in regard to establishment in areas involving the exercise of public
authority to which the first paragraph of article 55 applies, although they observe that "this
interpretation is not immediately obvious." See Smrr & H-Rzoo, supra note 23, f 55.03.
While the more obvious interpretation is that the Council might restrict both Community
nationals and third-country nationals from freely exercising the right of establishment in
certain sectors, since the provision refers to "activities" it does not appear to be intended
to confer the power to restrict the right to undertake activities on the basis of nationality.
70. See, eg., European Commission: Commission Denies Split, Saying GA2TNegotia-
tions Continuing, European Information Service, European Reports, Nov. 12, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, World Library, Eurrpt File (addressing the Commission's general authority
to negotiate). The author is advised by an official of the EC Commission office in Geneva,
Switzerland that the question of whether the General Agreement on Trade Services will be
concluded as a Community or a mixed Community/member state agreement is not yet
resolved.
Although the Community generally acts for the member states in the GATT, certain
GATT agreements have been entered into by the Community and the member states in
the form of so-called "mixed agreements" because of questions regarding Community
competence under the EEC Treaty. See Meinhard Hilf, The Application of GATT Within
the Member States of the European Community, With Special Attention to tie Federal Re-
public of Germany, in THE EUROPEAN Commutrrv AND GATI', supra note 10, at 153,
163-67 [hereinafter Hilf, The Application of GA7T Within the Member States of the Euro-
pean Community].
71. In discussing the Single European Act [hereinafter SEA], Meinhard Hill states the
following on this general issue:
The SEA does not prescribe rules with regard to services offered from third coun-
tries. Rules of access to the internal market still need to be defined. The Act
does not distinguish between persons or companies providing services inside the
Community on account of their nationality. The question of access for financial
services originating from third countries therefore remains open. Services have
not been covered by any multilateral agreement and do not yet form part of the
GATr's arrangements. Therefore, the Community is still free to regulate the op-
eration of various service sectors on the emerging internal market. This will also
involve a decision on how and under what conditions foreign operators should be
given access.
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One clear manifestation of the Community's restricted view of
the right of establishment and freedom to provide services appears in
the Second Banking Directive.72 The Second Banking Directive is in-
tended to establish uniform minimum standards for banking institu-
tions in the member states of the Community so that a single license
issued by a member state to a banking institution would permit that
enterprise to function throughout the Community on the same condi-
tions.73 The Second Banking Directive authorizes the Commission to
direct member states to limit or suspend decisions regarding authori-
zations to form new banking subsidiaries and decisions regarding the
prospective acquisition of holdings by third-country-controlled enter-
prises when the Commission finds that: "Community credit institu-
tions in a third country do not receive national treatment offering the
same competitive opportunities as are available to domestic credit in-
stitutions and [that] the conditions of effective market access are not
fulfilled. ' 74 While the potential finding of lack of reciprocal access
available to the Commission is less troublesome than an initially pro-
posed mandatory reciprocity determination prior to grant of a li-
cense,75 it nevertheless signals the Community's conclusion that under
the EEC Treaty, freedom of establishment and access to its services
market by third-country providers is a privilege and not a right.76 Par-
He thus suggests that service providers of third countries may be treated differently on the
basis of their nationality, but since the foregoing passage refers to "services originating
from third countries," Professor Hilf refers only to third-country-owned enterprises that
are not established with the Community.
72. Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Reg-
ulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Busi-
ness of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 771780, 1989 03. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter
Second Banking Directive]. An up-to-the-moment report on the status of the Second
Banking Directive and the actions of the Community in regard to it, as well as a report on
the status of proposed directives in other Community services sectors, can be found in Bob
Straetz, European Community Liberalizes Financial Services Market to Become More
Competitive, Busnqmss AmERICA (U.S. DEP'T OF COM.), Feb. 8, 1993, at 2, 3-5.
73. See generally Goldstein, supra note 27, at 221-30; Michael Gruson & Werner
Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European Economic Community and Its
Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 205 (1989); Michael Gruson &
Werner Nikowitz, The Reciprocity Requirement of the Second Banking Directive of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community Revisited, 12 FORDHAM INr'L L.J. 452 (1989).
74. Second Banking Directive, supra note 72, art. 9(4). The Commission itself may
only suspend or limit authorizations for a period of three months, but the Council may by
qualified majority extend this period. Id.
75. See THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT, supra note 10, at 153; Gold-
stein, supra note 27, at 221-30.
76. It is reported that in September 1992, the EC Commission released a paper that
discussed the treatment of EC banks in non-EC countries and concluded that EC banks
receive national treatment in the United States; the author of the report suggests this
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agraph 6 of article 9 of the Directive salutarily states: "Measures taken
pursuant to this article shall comply with the Community's obligations
under any international agreements, bilateral or multilateral, gov-
erning the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institu-
tions."'  Although it is possible that the Community views this
paragraph as a restriction on its authority to act in the face of member
state FCN Treaties, since it does not specifically reference the Com-
munity's obligations to the member states under the EEC Treaty, this
is not clear.
A situation similar to that for financial services exists with respect
to the telecommunications services market. 8 The provision of basic
telecommunications 79 services within the Community market is gener-
ally restricted to government-owned or government-chartered mo-
nopolies, principally through the operation of member state laws s°
The right to provide basic telecommunications services is generally ex-
empted from the FCN Treaties."' Foreign service providers are thus,
for the most part, effectively shut out of the basic voice telephone
market.
In 1990, the Council issued its Open Network Provision Direc-
tive 2 intended to harmonize rate structures and technical standards
throughout the Community, as well as to create conditions of "open
and efficient" access to the public telecommunications network based
on conditions guaranteeing equal and non-discriminatory access,
transparency, and objectivity.as The ONP Directive concerns the
means that U.S. banks will not be affected by the reciprocity clause in the Second Banking
Directive. See Straetz, supra note 72, at 4. Straetz notes that the Community has proposed
to include some form of reciprocity clause in several other services liberalization directives,
e.g., with respect to investment services (the "investment services directive contains a reci-
procity clause stating that a firm from a non-EC country can gain a single license so long as
that firm's home country gives EC firms 'national treatment and effective market access'"),
id. at 6, and insurance, id. at 7.
77. Second Banking Directive, supra note 71, art. 9(6).
78. See generally Abbott, GATT and ihe European Conununity, supra note 10, at 47-
51.
79. "Basic" telecommunications services are understood to have voice telephony at
their core, although basic service providers argue that other rudimentary services, such as
voice mail, should be included within the scope of the definition. "Value-added" services
include everything that is not part of basic services, e.g., data processing. See id. at 41.
80. Id. at 41-42.
81. Id.
82. Council Directive on the Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommuni-
cations Services through the Implementation of the Open Network Provision, 1990 OJ. (L
192) 1 [hereinafter ONP Directive].
83. Id. arts. 1, 2(10), 3(1), 6.
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value-added services market and does not mandate the opening of the
basic voice telephone market to Community-wide or foreign competi-
tion. The ONP Directive is addressed to affording benefits to enter-
prises established within the Community and does not, in this respect,
distinguish between Community-owned and third-country-owned es-
tablished enterprises. However, the preamble to the ONP Directive
states that the Community attaches major importance to increased
participation of Community service providers in third-country mar-
kets and "it will therefore be necessary, as detailed Directives are
elaborated, to ensure that these objectives are taken into account with
a view to reaching a situation where the realization of the more open
Community market for telecommunications services will, where ap-
propriate, be accompanied by reciprocal market opening else-
where." 4 Since U.S. telecommunications enterprise access to the
European market is a major issue in the current Uruguay Round serv-
ices negotiations, issues concerning reciprocal access between the
United States and European Community markets are likely to be ad-
dressed, if not resolved, in that forum.'- Nevertheless, it is of interest
to note that the Community considers reciprocity to be the basis for
negotiation of the opening of its internal value-added telecommunica-
tions services market.
The Maastricht Treaty8 6 would appear to clariy the position of
the Community with respect to the power of Community organs to
restrict third-country access to the internal market. New article 73(b)
to the EEC Treaty would add that within the framework of the Capi-
tal and Payments Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital
and payments between member states and third countries would be
prohibited. However, new article 73(c)(1) would preserve existing re-
strictions, and new article 73(c)(2) would provide:
Whilst endeavoring to achievethe objective of free movement of
capital between Member States and third countries to the greatest
extent possible and without prejudice to the other Chapters of this
Treaty, the Council may, acting by qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission, adopt measures on the movement of capital
to or from third countries involving direct investment - including
investment in real estate - establishment, the provision of financial
services or the admission of securities to capital markets. Unanim-
ity shall be required for measures under this paragraph which con-
84. Id. pmble., para. 28.
85. This is also the case with respect to the financial services market.
86. Maastricht IYeaty, supra note 4.
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stitute a step back in Community law as regards the liberalization of
the movement of capital to or from third countries.
If, as this article has suggested, the Council and Commission presently
may lack the authority under the EEC Treaty to restrict the right of
third-country-owned enterprises to establish in the individual member
states, the Maastricht treaty very clearly remedies this situation from
the standpoint of the Community organs. The right of third-country
establishment may be definitively restricted, as may be the provision
of financial services (at least directly from third countries). This does
not necessarily mean that the Community thereby derives the power
to override existing FCN Treaties. However, if the Council acts unani-
mously to suspend the right of third-country establishment, it would
be odd for the individual member states to pursue the position that
they will nevertheless stick to their FCN obligations - despite their
own vote at the Community level - and a move to denounce or
amend such FCN Treaties might follow as a matter of course. Thus,
the Maastricht Treaty is potentially troublesome on two fronts. First,
the Community is expressly granted the power to restrict third-coun-
try access to the member states. Second, if the member states vote to
restrict access, this action would represent an intent to supersede their
FCN obligations.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the position of U.S.-owned
enterprises within or approaching the Community is uncertain, if not
perhaps perilous. Community organs appear to have reserved the
right to discriminate with respect to establishment rights against U.S.-
owned companies on the basis of the absence of reciprocal treatment,
notwithstanding their seeming absence of authority under the EEC
Treaty to do so. While FCN Treaties appear to offer protection to
U.S.-owned companies in regard to the right to establish within cer-
tain member states, this is not clearly acknowledged in recent Com-
munity regulation. Most disturbing are the new provisions in the
Maastricht Treaty, which appear to grant expressly the power to Com-
munity organs to discriminate against third-country owners by re-
stricting the right of establishment.
The intentions of the Community vis-h-vis the United States must
be clarified. If the Community genuinely intends to restrict U.S. ac-
cess to the internal services market on the basis of reciprocity, then
there is indeed a real asymmetry between the rights afforded to Corn-
munity-owned companies entering or within the NAFTA and U.S.-
owned companies within or approaching the Community. One ap-
proach to resolving this issue that has been suggested is the negotia-
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tion of a comprehensive establishment treaty between the United
States and the Community qua Community that would spell out the
parties' reciprocal rights and obligations.8 7 A less dramatic approach
would involve the exchange of a memorandum of understanding be-
tween the United States and the responsible Community organs. In
any event, it should be apparent that liberal access of Community-
owned enterprises to the NAFTA services market through the mecha-
nism of establishment within a NAFTA country cannot well be bal-
anced against a Community policy of case-by-case reciprocity.
C. The Settlement of Disputes
It bears observing at this point that disputes between the member
states of the European Community with respect to interpretation and
application of the EEC Treaty are subject to resolution by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.88 The member states of the Community are
required to pursue a common external commercial policy imple-
mented by the Council and Commission. 9 With regard to interna-
tional organizations of an economic character involving matters of
particular interest to the Community, they proceed only by "common
action."90 In the GATr, the member states of the European Commu-
nity are represented by the Commission, pursue a common negotiat-
ing position, and act en bloc in matters within Community
competence.91 As a consequence of the foregoing, the member states
of the Community do not pursue the resolution of intra-Community
disputes in the GATT dispute settlement forum. Neither does the
ECJ consider the GATT General Agreement self-executing in respect
to the Community.92 The ECJ* therefore effectively supplants the
GATT dispute settlement forum with respect to intra-Community,
trade-related disputes and may render decisions inconsistent with the
Community's GATT-based obligations. 9
87. See Norton, supra note 27, § 10.06.
88. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, arts. 164 et seq.
89. Id. arts. 110-16.
90. Id. art. 116.
91. See Hilf, The Application of GATT Within the Member States of the European
Community, supra note 70, at 153, 163-67.
92. See Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int'l Fruit Co. N.V. v. Produktschap Voor Groenten en
Fruit 1972 E.C.R 1219. But see Case 188/85, Fediol v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 4155
(GATT rules are applied indirectly through the New Instrument). See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European Community Law,
3 E.J.I.L. 1, 11-12 (1992).
93. Though Petersmann objects to the non-application of the GATT by the ECJ, ho
recognizes this practice as current ECI practice. See Petersmann, supra note 92, at 11-12,
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II. THE SITUATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT
TO NON-PARTY GOODS, SERVICES,
AND INVESTMENT
The real or potential asymmetry between the treatment of non-
parties to NAFTA and non-member states of the European Commu-
nity involves disparate trade sectors. Whereas the Community offers
favorable terms to non-member states with respect to trade in goods
and potentially restrictive treatment in regard to trade in services,
NAFTA is characterized by restrictive terms with respect to the treat-
ment of non-party goods and open terms with respect to non-party
provided services.
A. Trade in Goods
NAFTA provides for the progressive elimination of tariffs on
trade in goods of Canadian, Mexican, or United States origin
("originating goods") as defined by the agreement.94 In general, tar-
iffs on originating goods are eliminated immediately or over a five-,
ten-, or fifteen-year period.95 Typically, to qualify as an originating
good, the good must be "wholly obtained or produced entirely in the
territory of one or more of the Parties,"'' undergo a change in tariff
classification (described in an annex) "as a result of production occur-
ring entirely in the territory of one or more of the Parties," or, in
situations in which a foreign-produced part(s) is included in a region-
ally-produced good and for technical reasons may not satisfy the
change in tariff classification requirement, the regional value content
of the whole good must exceed a set percentage.
97
In addition to the generally applicable rules of origin, specific
rules pertaining to the automotive sector require the progressive in-
crease over an eight-year period to a 62.5 percent regional value con-
tent for automobiles and certain original parts. 9- Specific rules of
origin for the textile sector typically limit originating apparel products,
for example, to those products cut or sewn in the territory of one of
94. "Originating" is defined as "qualifying under the rules of origin set out in Chapter
Four (Rules of Origin)." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 201(1).
95. Id. annex 302.2(1).
96. Id. art. 401(a).
97. Id. art. 401. The regional value of the good under the third test must not be less
than 60% where the transaction value method is used or 50% where the net cost method is
used. IdL art. 401(d).
98. Id. art. 403(5).
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the parties from material of regional origin.99 There are other specific
rules of origin for products such as computers. 100
The treatment by NAFTA of goods of non-party origin is sub-
stantially different from the treatment by the Community of non-
member origin goods. The Community assimilates third-country-
originating goods to goods produced in a member slate once the com-
mon tariff is paid. Third-country-produced goods acquire free circula-
tion within the Community. NAFTA discriminates against third-
country-produced goods by requiring that such goods undergo a
change in tariff classification or become part of regionally-produced
goods with specified regional value content before they can benefit
from preferential tariff treatment.
The likely effect of this discrimination vis-A-vis Community ex-
porters is difficult to gauge. It seems reasonable to assume that Com-
munity-based automobile producers will suffer in comparison with
United States and Canadian producers with respect to exports to
Mexico because of disparate tariff treatment. Concern has been ex-
pressed that Community automobile parts producers will be adversely
affected as North American manufacturers seek to assure an accepta-
ble level of regional value content for their cars. 01 Mexican duties
are relatively high for some products of interest to Community ex-
porters, such as electronic capital goods (including telephone switch-
ing equipment and telecommunications equipment) and machine
tools. 0 2 It is apparent that U.S.-based manufacturers will gain a com-
petitive advantage over Community exporters to Mexico in industries
that enjoy relatively high Mexican tariff protection. Mexican tariff re-
ductions will apply only to "originating products" under NAFTA.'0 3
99. See, e.g., id. annex 401, ch. 61 n.2. Only the fiber-comprising yarn may be im-
ported, resulting in a so-called "yarn forward" rule. See also ITC Report, supra note 1, at
8-2.
100. NAFrA, supra note 1, annex 401, chs. 84-85. See also ITC Report, supra note 1, at
5-2.
101. See EC Parliament Report, supra note 7.
102. While the nominal U.S. tariff on U.S. electronic products imported from Mexico
averages 5% ad valorem, Mexican tariffs on U.S. origin electronic products are an average
estimated 16% ad valorem. For machine tools, Mexican tariffs range from 10 to 20% ad
valorem. See The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Mrade Agreement With
Mexico, USITC Publication 2353 (Feb. 1991), at 4-25, 4-26, 4-33.
103. In economic terms, there will be trade diversion with respect to the Community
and trade creation with regard to the United States.
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The extent to which Community producers will suffer diversion of
their trade is difficult to predict -ex ante.) 4
With respect to government procurement, NAFTA will provide
substantial market opening for goods that benefit from national treat-
ment.10 5 NAFTA provides that the rules of origin generally applicable
for conferring intraregional preferences will apply with respect to gov-
ernment procurement 3 6 Therefore, Community-originating goods
that obtain a regional character through substantial transformation or
otherwise will qualify for national treatment with respect to govern-
ment procurement relating to covered purchasing entities and goods.
B. Services and Investment
NAFTA acts to liberalize trade in services between Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States by extending the rights of national and
MFN treatment to the service providers of each party.107 Service
providers of the parties are not required to establish a presence within
each other's respective territories to enjoy the right to provide serv-
ices. 08 The parties are entitled to maintain existing discriminatory
measures, which are set forth in an annex to the agreement, though
many of these measures are subject to liberalization commitments, 109
as well as to adopt and maintain discriminatory measures.110 The
United States has reserved its basic telephone services sector (but not
its value added sector) from present and future liberalization commit-
ments."' Air transport sector-related services are generally excluded
from the scope of the agreement," 2 and financial services are dealt
with in a chapter of the agreement separate from the general services
framework." 3 While there are limitations on the commitments of the
parties with respect to financial services (at least on a temporary ba-
104. See Abbott, GATT and the European Conmmunity, supra note 10, at 7-8. The two
major reports produced by the International Trade Commission offered no specific predic-
tion regarding the trade diverting impact of NAFTA on the European Community. See
rTC Report, supra note 1.
105. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1003 and related annexes.
106. Id. art. 1004.
107. Id. arts. 1202, 1203.
108. Id art. 1205.
109. Id. art. 1206(1), annex I.
110. Id. art. 1206(3), annex I.
111. Id. annex IL
112. Id. art. 1201(b).
113. Services are generally covered in Chapter Twelve. Financial services are covered in
Chapter Fourteen. NAFTA, supra note 1, chs. 12, 14.
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sis),114 the guiding principles of the financial services chapter never-
theless are national and MFN treatment. 115
NAFTA provides liberal treatment to service providers of non-
party countries through the mechanism of an establishment criterion.
Pursuant to the services chapter, national treatment and MFN rights
are extended by each party to "service providers of another Party.
116
A service provider of a party is defined as "a person of a Party that
seeks to provide or provides a service. 11 7 A "person of a Party" is
defined by NAFTA as "a national, or an enterprise of a Party." 118 An
"enterprise" is generally defined by NAFTA as a form of business or-
ganized under applicable law. 1 9 NAFTA specifically includes busi-
ness branches in the definition of enterprises for purposes of the
services chapter.' 20 An "enterprise of a Party" is defined by the serv-
ices chapter as "an enterprise constituted or organized under the law
of a Party, and a branch located in the territory of a Party and carrying
out business activities there.' 12' Therefore, a business organization
established in the territory of a NAFTA party qualifies for the benefits
of the services chapter regardless of the ultimate country of ownership
of the organization.
There is, however, a provision which permits third-country-
owned enterprises to be denied access to the privileges of the services
chapter. Article 1211(2) provides:
Subject to prior notification and consultation.., a Party may deny
the benefits of this Chapter to a services provider of another Party
where the Party establishes that the service is being provided by an
enterprise that is owned or controlled by persons of a non-Party and
114. See, e.g., id. art. 1409, annex VII. See infra text accompanying notes 132-138 re-
garding restrictions on financial services investments. There is provision for continuing
consultation regarding future liberalization commitments. See, e.g., id. art. 1404(4) and
annex 1404.4.
115. Id. arts. 1405-06.
116. See, e.g., id. arts. 1202-03.
117. Id. art. 1213(2).
118. Id. art. 201(1).
119. Article 201 defines "enterprise" as "any entity constituted or organized under ap-
plicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately-owned or governmentally.
owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or
other association." Id. art. 201(1).
120. Id. art. 1213(2). At least on an interim basis, financial institutions may need to be
incorporated in the territory of the party in which they are providing services to enjoy the
benefits of the financial services chapter. Id. art. 1403.
121. Id. art. 1213.
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that has no substantial business activities in the territory of any Party
(emphasis added). 122
The financial services chapter of NAFTA expressly incorporates arti-
cle 1211 of the services chapter regarding denial of benefits. 123
NAFTA does not define "substantial business activities" and thus
leaves an element of discretion to the parties to deny the benefits of
the services chapter to foreign-owned enterprises. 24 However, as a
practical matter it seems unlikely that the requirement of a substantial
business presence will meaningfully hinder a foreign (e.g., Commu-
nity-owned) enterprise from conducting a services trade within
NAFTA because: (a) in most cases establishment will not be in doubt;
and (b) the phrase "substantial business activities" conveys content
familiar to commercial lawyers and is not especially susceptible to ar-
bitrary interpretation and application.
NAFTA will enhance opportunities for regional enterprises with
respect to the supply of services to the government market.12 The
rule pursuant to which the NAFTA parties are permitted to deny gov-
ernment procurement access to non-party-owned enterprises is
equivalent to that generally established in the services chapter. That
is, a foreign-owned enterprise may be denied government procure-
ment-related benefits if it "has no substantial business activities in the
territory of any Party."'"
NAFTA contains a separate chapter with respect to investment.
The investment chapter confers the rights of national and MFN treat-
ment to investors of another party and their investments "with respect
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.""2 The spe-
cific content of the obligation is set forth to include prohibition of
minimum levels of local equity ownership'-1 and prohibition of the
122. Under article 1211(1), it is possible for a party to deny benefits with respect to
services provided by third-country-controlled enterprises when the party does not maintain
diplomatic relations with the third country or when the third country has had prohibitory
measures imposed against it. Id. art 1211(1).
123. Id art. 1401(2).
124. There are numerous potential legal analogies in U.S. domestic law to the "substan-
tial business activities" requirement, particularly in the area of State tax and business regu-
lation with respect to foreign enterprises doing or transacting business within the State.
See, eg., CAj. CoRP. CODE § 191 (West 1990) and definition of "transact intrastate busi-
ness" and annotations thereto, and CA. CoRP. CODE § 2100 (West 1990).
125. See NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1003 and related annexes.
126. Id art. 1005(1).
127. Id art. 1102(1), (2).
128. Id art. 1102(4).
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imposition of performance requirements.129 These obligations are
subject to present and prospective reservations by the parties with re-
spect to sectors and regulations set out in annexes to the agreement.
1 30
These annexes are largely the same as those that pertain to the serv-
ices chapter and, again, the United States has excluded investment in
its basic telephone services sector.131 Mexico has excluded invest-
ment, inter alia, in its petroleum sector.1
32
In general, investments in the financial services sector are gov-
erned by the financial services chapter.13 3 The financial services chap-
ter generally accords the rights of national and MFN treatment to
investors of each party,3 4 including an express right of establish-
ment, 35 and incorporates article 1211 on denial of benefits. 36 Excep-
tions, which are set forth in an annex, include certain limited U.S.
restrictions applicable to foreign banks regarding interstate bank-
ing.137 Investments in the Mexican financial services sector are con-
siderably restricted during a transition period.' 38  Canada has
specifically limited ownership in Canadian-controlled financial institu-
tions, with a limited exemption from restrictions on total Canadian
assets that may be held by foreign bank subsidiaries to enterprises
controlled by residents of the United States and Mexico.
139
On the whole, NAFTA offers to EC enterprises access to its serv-
ices and investment liberalization measures equivalent to those of-
fered to residents of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The only
constraint is that the EC enterprise establish itself in the regional ter-
ritory through the organization of an entity and, generally, through
the establishment of a branch. The same FCN Treaties pursuant to
which U.S. enterprises have access to countries in the Community
should provide access to EC enterprises seeking establishment in the
United States. Through the route of establishment, NAFTA services
and investment markets are open to EC-owned enterprises. Since
there is no suggestion in NAFTA that a regional institution will have
129. Id. art. 1106.
130. Id. art. 1108, annexes I, II, III, IV (limited to MFN exception).
131. Ia annex II.
132. Id. art. 1101, annex III.
133. Id. art. 1101(3).
134. Id. arts. 1405-06.
135. Id. art. 1403.
136. Id. art. 1401(2).
137. Id. art. 1409, annex VII, § A.
138. Id. art. 1409, annex VII, § B.
139. Id. art. 1409, annex VII, § C.
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the power to restrict or condition access to the regional services mar-
ket, there is little ambiguity in this area. The United States could ter-
minate its FCN Treaties with EC member countries if it believed it
was being denied reasonably equivalent services and investment treat-
ment in the Community. However, this would not preclude EC-
owned enterprises from establishing themselves in Canada or Mexico
and thereby from gaining access to the intra-NAFTA market.
Although NAFTA appears to offer EC-owned enterprises more
liberal access to national treatment than the European Community
wishes to acknowledge with respect to U.S.-owned enterprises, there
is a distinction between NAFTA and the EC that diminishes the value
of the potentially more favorable treatment by NAFTA. Unlike the
European Community, NAFrA does not set out as one of its goals the
progressive harmonization of national laws so as to create a more effi-
cient internal market. Unlike the Community, NAFTA does not cre-
ate central regional institutions with authority to direct the
approximation of laws. Therefore, the national treatment that an EC-
owned company will receive within NAFTA is the national treatment
of each individual country party and not a unified regional-national
treatment, such as is often accorded by the institutions of the EEC
Treaty.
C. The Settlement of Disputes under NAFTA
The general dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA is con-
tained in Chapter 20. Disputes between the parties may be resolved
at the discretion of the complaining country party under either GAT
or NAFTA.14 However, if a third-country party requests settlement
under NAFTA, a dispute will usually be settled under NAFTA. 41
Matters involving the relationship of NAFTA to specified environ-
mental agreements,' 42 and sanitary and phytosanitary measures or
standards measures relating to the environment, must be settled under
the NAFTA mechanism at the request of the respondent. 143 After
consultation has failed, at the request of a party, an arbitral panel is
established.'" A party is expected to comply with a decision of an
140. Id. art. 2005(1).
141. Id. art. 2005(2).
142. Id. art. 2005(3).
143. Id. art. 2005(4).
144. Id. art. 2008(2). A third party may join as a complainant. Id. art. 2008(3). If the
third party does not join as complainant, it is expected to refrain from initiating separate
proceedings under NAFrA or GAT on substantially similar grounds. Id. art. 2008(4).
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arbitral panel, preferably by reforming or removing an offending mea-
sure.145 If a complained-against party fails to comply satisfactorily
with a panel decision, the complaining party "may suspend the appli-
cation to the Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect
until such time as they have reached agreement on a resolution of the
dispute.
14 6
A separate dispute settlement mechanism is established for an-
tidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) matters.1 47 Under this
mechanism, decisions of arbitral panels1 48 with respect to appeals of
AD/CVD final determinations are binding on the parties as to the
matter at issue. 49 In addition, pursuant to the NAFTA investment
chapter, the country parties agree to submit dispules with investors
(including enterprises) of other parties to binding third-party arbitra-
tion (i.e., under the ICSID Convention or in accordance with UNCI-
TRAL rules).150 The country parties are expected to provide for the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards resulting from this
process.' 5' Investors, for example enterprises of a party, are not re-
strictively defined (e.g., in accordance with the nationality of their ulti-
mate ownership),152 so that the investment arbitration process should
be open to EC-owned enterprises established in NAFTA territory.
111. REGIONAL ASYMMETRIES
The legal nature of the asymmetries between the treatment of-
fered to U.S. exports and enterprises by the European Community
and the treatment offered to Community exports and enterprises by
NAFTA is fairly clear in its overall context. The EC provides advan-
tages to U.S. exporters of goods whose products acquire free circula-
tion within the Community, after having cleared the common tariff
wall. The EC accords disadvantages to U.S. service providers who
may be subject to reciprocity determinations and restrictions on the
145. Id. art. 2018.
146. Id. art. 2019(1).
147. Id. ch. 19.
148. The panels consider complaints regarding the compatibility with NAFTA of
amendments to national AD/CVD laws (although NAFTA does not itself establish specific
substantive AD/CVD rules) and replace national judicial authorities with respect to ap-
peals of final administrative determinations in AD/CVD actions. NAFTA, supra note 1,
arts. 1903-04.
149. Id. art. 1904.
150. Id. arts. 1115 et seq.
151. Id. art. 1136(4).
152. See, e.g., id. art. 1139.
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right of establishment and freedom to provide services. Although the
EEC Treaty may not sanction such actions, particularly in light of ex-
isting bilateral FCN Treaties, the Council and Commission have evi-
denced the presumption that it is within their power to deny
establishment and freedom of services rights to foreign-owned enter-
prises. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union would appear to
grant expressly to the Community organs this power. NAFTA pro-
vides advantages to Community service providers in that it unambigu-
ously grants them the benefit of national treatment within NAFTA
territory on the relatively straightforward condition of establishment
somewhere within the region. NAFTA disadvantages Community ex-
porters of goods by denying them the benefit of preferential tariff
treatment within NAFTA territory.
It is difficult to discern the likely aggregate economic impact of
this imbalance. In 1990, the total value of U.S. merchandise exports
to the Community was $98 billion; the total value of EC merchandise
exports to the United States was $92 billion."53 Leading U.S. exports
included aircraft, computers and parts, and telecommunications
equipment." 4 Automobiles were the principal EC export to the
United States, accounting for $7.5 billion of export earnings; automo-
bile parts were the seventh leading EC export, accounting for $2.5
billion.155 It seems reasonable to conclude that the EC has a substan-
tial interest in, for example, intra-NAFTA tariff preferences in the au-
tomobile (and parts thereof) sector, just as the United States has a
substantial interest in, for example, free intra-Community circulation
of computer equipment.
In 1991, the United States exported services to the European
Community valued at $46.5 billion.' 56 The largest areas of gross re-
ceipts included travel, other private services, and royalty payments.""
In 1991, the European Community exported services valued at $45.7
billion to the United States." 8 The largest U.S payment outflows in-
volved direct defense expenditures, travel, and other private serv-
153. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INT'L TRADE ADMiN., U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights 1990 11,
15 (1991).
154. Id. at 80. Telecommunications equipment was ninth on the list at approximately $2
billion. This is of interest in light of existing discriminatory EC government procurement
preferences for telecommunications equipment.
155. Id. at 81.
156. Christopher L. Bach, U.S. International Transactions, Second Quarter1992, in SuR.
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ices. 159 Excluding U.S. payments to the Community for support of
military operations, the United States had a very substantial services
trade surplus with the Community. It is not clear, however, how
meaningful the foregoing figures are for present purposes. Since these
figures reflect payment flows, they do not necessarily reflect the dy-
namics of U.S. services investment in the Community (or EC services
investment in the United States) which may not involve payments
flows on a current basis. For example, an EC affiliate of a U.S. parent
may, for a variety of reasons, not repatriate earnings on a current ba-
sis. Perhaps it is more interesting to note that Community gains ex-
pected from integration of its financial services market are estimated
at $26.4 billion.'6 ' In any event, it is clear that the United States has a
substantial interest in non-discriminatory access to the Community
services market, just as the Community does with respect to the U.S./
NAFTA services market.
There is a compelling reason to believe that the United States
would suffer greater harm from EC restrictions on U.S. services access
to the EC market than the Community will suffer from lack of prefer-
ential tariff treatment within the NAFTA automobile export market.
The Mexican automobile market is, at present, not of great signifi-
cance to the Community or other exporting countries, and there is
adequate time for European manufacturers to establish themselves
within Mexico or the United States to take advantage of future mar-
ket opportunities. If European manufacturers are able to establish
themselves within NAFTA, they will largely overcome the negative
effects of lack of preferential intra-NAFTA tariff treatment respecting
third-country exports. On the other hand, if U.S. service providers are
denied national treatment within the Community services market they
will not have, short of government intervention, an apparent mecha-
nism for overcoming this barrier.
IV. THE REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN ]PARLIAMENT
COMMIIEE ON EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
AND RESOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
An important perspective on NAFTA is reflected in the Report
of the European Parliament Committee on External Economic Rela-
159. lIL
160. See Straetz, supra note 72, at 2 (citing the Cecchini Report on the "Costs of Non-
Europe" prepared for the European Commission).
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tions on the Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of
America, Canada and Mexico ["EC Parliament Report" or "Re-
port"].' 6' The EC Parliament Report takes a thoughtful approach to
the prospective NAFTA, noting first the likely positive economic and
political consequences for Mexico and recognizing the interest of the
United States in promoting such developments. 62 After briefly sum-
marizing the major substantive provisions of NAFTA, the Report
turns to the potential consequences for third countries, including the
Community. 63 The Report suggests that the countries facing the
most severe short-term negative consequences of NAFTA will include
the Latin American and the Caribbean countries that face the diver-
sion of their exports to the United States in favor of Mexico. The
Report also suggests that Southeast Asian nations may be adversely
affected as Asian investment capital is redirected toward Mexico.
With respect to the Community,.the Report specifically identifies ex-
ports of yam, principally to Canada, and exports of automobile parts
and components as likely to be adversely affected. Of some interest,
however, is the strong perception of a silver lining in the gray clouds:
It would appear that foreign investors in the NAFTA countries will
receive no less favorable treatment than will American, Canadian
or Mexican companies. Since fifty-seven percent of foreign direct
investments in the U.S. are European, the presence of European
affiliates may be an important factor in gaining competitive advan-
tage against other third countries (notably Japan and Korea).
164
Finally, with respect to third countries, the EC Parliament Report as-
serts that the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism may disadvan-
tage third countries if NAFTA develops a jurisprudence different
from that of the GATT. 6" In this regard, the Report fails to also note
the role of the ECJ and its distinct (even though distinguished)
jurisprudence.
The Report considers the prospective legality of NAFTA under
article XXIV of GAIT. The Report notes that deficiencies in article
XXIV preclude its meaningful application and that it is unlikely that
the NAFTA will be disapproved in the GAT. This aspect of the Re-
161. See EC Parliament Report, supra note 7.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id. at 13-14.
164. Id. at 13. The EC Parliament Report notes the possibility of discriminatory treat-
ment of third-country-owned enterprises in the Canadian financial services market, but
observes that the operative provision of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement has not
been invoked against a European-owned company. Id. at 13-14, 14 n.9.
165. Id. at 14.
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port is certainly bolstered by the recent Report of the GATE Working
Party on the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United
States,166 which makes clear the lack of substantive content in article
XX-V.167
The Report finally considers the long term implications of
NAFrA for the global trading system and the Community in particu-
lar. The Report speculates that a two-bloc American/Asian/European
trading system is more likely to emerge than a three-bloc system, in-
cluding a separate Asian arrangement.168 The Report is not inclined
to exaggerate the dangers posed by such a development, but does note
that "an expanded NAFrA would not necessarily be in the Commu-
nity's best interest.' 69 As a countermeasure, the Report strongly
urges a successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round and sug-
gests that with adequate discipline free trade areas "can be useful
building blocks of the world trade regime."17
0
A. The Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security
for the Committee on External Economic Relations
Appended to the EC Parliament Report is an Opinion of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security for the Committee on Ex-
ternal Economic Relations ["Foreign Affairs Opinion"].' 7'
The disparity between the views expressed in the EC Parliament
Report and the Foreign Affairs Opinion is striking. So striking, in
fact, is the disparity between these views that the following lengthy
quotation is justified:
The NAFTA agreement, for which U.S. President George Bush
campaigned vigorously, establishes a free trade area in which the
United States will carry by far the greatest economic, trading, polit-
ical, and strategic weight: Canada and Mexico cannot compete with
the American giant on equal terms. No common institutions are to
be set up under the agreement, nor will any steps be subsequently
166. Report of the GATT Working Party on the Free Trade Agreement Between Can-
ada and the United States (GATT Doc. L/6927, Oct. 31, 1991), adopted by GATT Council,
Nov. 12, 1991, reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MAT., Jan. 1992, at 5.
167. For a discussion of article XXIV and its application to the European Community,
see Abbott, GATT and the European Community, supra note 10. For a discussion of arti-
cle XXIV and its application to the NAFTA, see Abbott, Integration Without Institutions,
supra note 1.
168. EC Parliament Report, supra note 7, at 16.
169. Id. at 17.
170. Id.
171. Foreign Affairs Opinion, supra note 8, at 19-22.
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taken towards establishing more complex forms of cooperation.
NAFTA, therefore, cannot be likened in any way to the process
which has been continuing in Europe for over 40 years and is mov-
ing towards the ultimate goal of union.
Outlining the philosophy behind the agreement when speaking
to journalists, President Bush declared that the cold war was now
over and the main challenge facing the United States was to com-
pete on a rapidly changing and expanding global market.
In fact, the other side of the coin is that the United States is
having to contend with growing competition - not only in economic
terms - from Japan and Europe. The downturn in the U.S. economy
(unemployment and balance of trade deficit) could ultimately place
a question mark over the country's currently unchallenged world
supremacy. To counter a Europe which is consolidating its strength
and moving towards union, as well as an increasingly enterprising
Japan which is continuing to extend its sphere of influence, the
United States is thus expanding its hegemony over both halves of
the American continent. The advent of NAFTA will bring a very
severe predicament for the Central and South American countries,
which may eventually be crushed under the weight of the new eco-
nomic bloc.
That being the case, the Community must ensure that the es-
tablishment of the North American Free Trade Area does not lead
to greater protectionism, pose an obstacle to the development and
expansion of transatlantic relations, or jeopardize the continuation
of Community policy in relation to Latin America.
In view of its close political, economic, and cultural ties with
most Central and South American countries, for which it constitutes
a vital reference point, the Community needs to consolidate its posi-
tion in the region. The idea of a European plan for Latin America
should be reactivated and explored further in order to save coun-
tries and markets from being swallowed up into the U.S. sphere of
influence and to avert the resulting heavy blow to Europe's political
prestige as well as to its economy.17
In light of the Foreign Affairs Opinion, which evidently views the es-
tablishment of NAFTA as a considerable threat to the political and
economic interests of the Community, it is apparent that U.S. politi-
cians and trade negotiators should expect to encounter in the Commu-
nity, in addition to a comparatively moderate perspective on NAFTA
as evidenced by the EC Parliament Report, at least some faction of
172. Id. at 21.
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Community leaders who are inclined to view the conclusion of
NAFTA as the prelude to a global trade war.
B. The Resolution of the European Parliament
On December 15, 1992, the European Parliament adopted a Res-
olution on the Free Trade Agreement between the United States of
America, Canada, and Mexico.173 The resolution, inter alia,
"welcom[es] the NAFTA agreement to the extent that it will prove
trade-creating rather than trade-diverting."' 74 The resolution ex-
presses concern with the impact of rules of origin on EC exporters of
textiles and automobiles, and with respect to possible Canadian re-
strictions in the financial services sector.175 The resolution also notes
concern over the possible effect that NAFTA dispute settlement may
have on the "effectiveness of the GATT dispute settlement mecha-
nism."' 7 The resolution, inter alia, calls on the Commission to pre-
pare a report on NAFTA's potential effects on the Community and
Latin America for the Council and Parliament; requests the Commis-
sion and the Member States to inquire within the OECD about the
compatibility of NAFTA financial services provisions with OECD
rules that concern national treatment of foreign investment; calls for a
rapid conclusion of the Uruguay Round (requesting the Commission
to suggest ways to improve article XXIV); and "[clalls on the Com-
mission and the Council to develop economic and political relations
with Latin America and Asia as much as possible."'
77
V. THE CONSEQUENCE AND CURES OF
REGIONAL ASYMMETRY
The coming into force of NAFTA will open a new era in U.S.-
European Community trade relations. Undoubtedly, this new era will
be characterized by continuing negotiations aimed at achieving a tol-
erable balance between the trade advantages and disadvantages each
region presents to the other. The United States will be seeking to
ensure comparable market access in the services sector, while the
Community will be seeking to enhance access of its exported goods to
preferential intra-NAFTA tariff treatment. These issues will become
173. Resolution A3-0378/92, PV 42 II, PE 163.452 (Official Minutes of the European
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increasingly important to each side as the territorial scope of the other
increases: the Community through expansion into the European Eco-
nomic Area and through further accessions; NAFTA by progressive
incorporation of other countries of the Western Hemisphere.
As a first priority, the parties should attempt to clarify the ex-
isting juridical situation with respect to the right of U.S.-owned enter-
prises to participate in the integrated EC services market. This
requires clarification of the authority of the Commission and Council
to restrict access to establishment of third-country service providers,
as well as clarification of the relationship between and among existing
FCN Treaties, the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Move-
ments, and the EEC Treaty. If the Community is able to offer assur-
ance to the United States in this area, there will be substantial reason
for the Untied States to look favorably on an EC request for more
favorable third-country treatment with respect to rules of origin. Of
course, it may be that, as the Report of the EC Parliament implies, the
EC will gain a greater advantage through the participation of its direct
investment enterprises in a protected NAFTA than it will from open-
ing that market. The EC may, therefore, choose not to pursue less
restrictive rules of origin. If the EC balks at providing assurances with
respect to services market access, the U.S. may have no alternative
other than to urge its NAFTA partners to restrict EC services access
in NAFTA.
On the North American side of the equation, it will be highly
desirable to create a coordinated, external negotiating position with
respect to the Community and other third parties. If this does not
occur, the prospect is very real that the United States, Canada, and
Mexico will individually seek to attract inward investment and out-
ward market openings through the grant of special incentives applica-
ble to each country's respective territory. Such competition will
inevitably result in serious intra-NAFTA political strain and threaten
the long-term viability of the arrangement. There is historical evi-
dence with respect to the Andean Pact that suggests that the lack of a
coordinated external policy will give rise to political tension and a ten-
dency toward disintegration.178 The NAFTA countries would be well
served by coordinating their policy with respect to the Community.
178. After Decision 24 restricting inward foreign investment was adopted, the Andean
Pact countries essentially competed to provide exemptions from its mandate. This was one
factor which ultimately lead to its repudiation.
1993]
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A well-recognized risk inherent in future U.S./NAFTA-Commu-
nity relations is the marginalization of third-country interests. There
is a danger that non-aligned countries will lack the bargaining power
to offer reciprocal concessions to the two emerging regional blocs and,
as a consequence, will suffer serious adverse consequences from trade
diversion. Once again, the importance of a successful conclusion to
the GATT Uruguay Round and the incorporation of greater discipline
in article XXIV must be emphasized as necessary to avoiding the frag-
mentation of the global trading system.
Finally, there is good prospect that the countries of NAFTA and
the European Community are facing a win-win situation in their fu-
ture negotiations. Enhanced market access offers the possibility of
mutually reinforcing economic growth; economic growth enhances
political stability and social security. It is unfortunate that some
choose to characterize the emergence of NAFTA and strengthening of
the Community as the precursors of an inter-regional trade war. It is
the obligation of moderate politicians and trade negotiators to avoid
the rhetoric of war and concentrate on creating the basis for transat-
lantic cooperation.
[Vol. 16
